Abstract: When customers enjoy the benefits from pervasive electronic applications such as mobile payment and online transaction, what we cannot ignore is that the adversaries may infringe privacy by cracking the authentication information. As an effective countermeasure, considerable smart-card-based ID authentication schemes have been proposed. However, these methods are found actually more or less vulnerable to certain attacks. Therefore, we propose a scheme based on smart card's mutual authentication mechanism, which can completely hide all the information concerned with the user's ID and defeat most known attacks launched by the adversaries. When the user uses the same identity and password to register different accounts, the attacker cannot obtain the user's password even if he or she knows the user's corresponding identity and cannot achieve a password-guessing attack. Compared with several prevalent schemes, without sacrificing the computational efficiency, our solution can achieve higher security.
Introduction
Nowadays, all kinds of prevalent IT applications such as quick payment, electronic commerce, social network and cloud storage have improved the life qualities of people owing to the development of mobile internet technologies. All the network services and applications provided conveniences for people, while followed with a variety of security threats. For example, attacks such as account stolen, transfer fraud and malicious bundled consumption frequently occurred in quick payment services (Xiao et al., 2008) . Consequently, an effective authentication scheme was needed, which could guarantee the individual's information security without increasing computation cost.
In general, ID authentication was the fundamental of users' information safeguard. ID authentication system based on smart card has been extensively applied in many business fields like internet bank, electronic commerce and quick payment owing to its merits on security and efficiency. For the demands of practical applications, researchers were eager to find an approach to achieve the perfect combination between mobile devices and smart card when dealing with security drawbacks in current authentication systems. Even if they made such great efforts in pursuit of achieving the high-level security, weakness such as incapability of resisting password-guessing attack and man-in-middle attack could still be found in their authentication schemes, until Chen et al. (2014) proposed an authentication scheme and claimed that it was secure against almost all of known attacks on the user's ID. However, we proved Chen's scheme was still incompetent in maintaining users' ID information in a safe place.
In this paper, first, we cryptanalysed Chen's scheme and pointed out its security loopholes. Second, we proposed a new authentication scheme based on smart card, which might hide the user's identity information. Finally, the proposal was compared with other classic peers and the result illustrated that the proposal achieved higher security without losing computational efficiency.
The remainder of this paper was organised as follows. Section 2 gave a brief review of some concerned researchers' work. Apart from stating the preliminary knowledge, Section 3 mainly analysed the drawbacks of Chen's scheme. The proposed scheme was described in Section 4. Section 5 analysed the performance of the proposal in regard to security and computation efficiency when compared with others. Conclusions were drawn in Section 6. Lamport (1981) proposed the password-based remote user authentication scheme over an insecure channel for the first time. The author's scheme stores the user's password in the database of server, which is incapable of protecting the user's privacy for the reason that adversaries probably steal the user's password from the database (Lei et al., 2008a) . Considerable researches have been conducted in this field to make authentication systems become more convenient and safer (Lee et al., 2005; Chen, 2011; Yang et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2015; Lei et al., 2008b) . Many methods suggested the authentication information may be stored in the smart cards hold by the users who can achieve the remote authentication in a relatively secure way by utilising their own authentication keys. However, some of these methods may lead to private information leakage when facing different types of attacks owing to the vulnerabilities of the authentication scheme itself (Shao et al., 2016) . Messerges et al. (2002) claimed that all the information stored in the smart card may be withdrawn by the attackers once the smart card is controlled in their hands. Consequently, most of the authentication schemes based on smart card face the risk of user's privacy compromised once the smart card is lost or stolen. Moreover, many users use the same ID and password when registering multiple accounts on different websites, which further increases the probability of the user's ID stolen (Xiao et al., 2014) . Unfortunately, most of the current authentication schemes have not encrypted the user's ID in the registration and authentication phase. Xu et al. (2009) proposed an authentication scheme based on smart card and declared that this scheme has ability to ensure the user's information security even if the information stored in the smart card are stolen by the attackers. Shortly afterwards, Sood et al. (2010) proved Xu's scheme cannot resist the offline guessing attack and forgery attack and, meanwhile, they put forward their own authentication scheme and claimed that the proposal has addressed all the security problems in Xu's scheme and has greatly enhanced the performance compared with Xu's work. Song (2010) also analysed Xu's scheme and proved that a legitimate anonymous user can launch the impersonation attack by extracting other users' information stored in their smart cards. And then, he put forward his own approach, which is considered to withstand all the attacks mentioned earlier. Chen et al. (2014) pointed out that Sood's and Song's authentication systems have suffered many security defects. First, they considered Sood's scheme has not achieved the effective two-way authentication and there only exists the one-way user authentication, which may cause the server impersonation attack. Second, they proved that Song's scheme is incomplete because the private key in the registration phase is fixed, which provides opportunities for the attackers to launch password-guessing attacks. Finally, they presented their own authentication scheme and claimed this scheme is secure from replay attack, man-in-middle attack, impersonation attack and other attacks.
Related work
However, some researchers considered that Chen's approach has not withstood the server impersonation attack, user impersonation attack and password-guessing attack. Moreover, the leakage of session key may occur during the mutual authentication between the user and the server . Qi et al. (2015) analysed the defects of Chen's scheme and provided their own solutions. Wei et al. (2016) noticed that Qi's scheme cannot provide perfect forward secrecy and password change service, since it inherits the main body of Chen's scheme. But, we have found neither Qi's scheme nor Wei's scheme can achieve the goal on protecting the user's ID. Once an attacker obtains the user's ID, he or she will search the same or similar ID in the database accessed by him or her, and then he or she may carry out the high-precision passwordguessing attack. It is highly possible that the attacker can successfully catch the correct password if the user prefers to use the same ID and password when registering different accounts (Madhusudan and Valiveti, 2015) . Therefore, we need to design an authentication scheme to resolve all of these security problems mentioned earlier especially focusing on protecting the user's ID. After analysis and comparison, the main contributions of this paper can be described as follows:
• The proposed authentication scheme achieves high security, which is able to withstand the smart card stolen attack, password-guessing attack, user impersonation attack, server impersonation attack, man-in-middle attack and other types of attacks.
• The proposed authentication scheme hides the user's ID and password during the registration phase to protect the user's all login information. Even if an attacker intercepts the authentication information between the user and the server, he or she would not have more chances to guess the user's password.
• The proposed authentication scheme is designed to ensure the computation efficiency. And, it achieves the desirable performance on time consumption.
3 Review of the scheme of Chen et al.
Mathematical preliminaries

The difficulty of discrete logarithm
Suppose g is the generator of the manifold p G , where p is a big prime number. Calculate mod
, where f is a positive integer. The difficulty lies in that f cannot be calculated if only know g , p and F .
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Notations involved in Chen's scheme
In Table 1 , some notations from Chen's scheme will be used in our solutions. 
Security loopholes in the scheme of Chen et al.
Chen's scheme contains a total of five phases, namely initialisation phase, registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase, respectively. More detailed descriptions regarding the five phases can be found in this paper (Chen et al., 2014) . Even if Chen claimed his scheme could withstand almost all of attacks, we have found Chen's scheme has the following design flaws:
1 User's privacy is not successfully preserved
In the login phase of Chen's authentication system, the user's ID is sent to the server in the form of 'plaintext'. It is easy for an attacker to launch the user impersonation attack and server impersonation attack once he or she intercepts the login information.
2 Lack of the mechanism on abolishing lost smart card
If the user's smart card is lost or stolen, attackers will be able to crack the user's information stored in the smart card with high probability and, meanwhile, launch the user impersonation attack and the server impersonation attack. Simultaneously, Chen's scheme cannot resist the following attacks. 
S . The user impersonation attack will be successfully achieved owing to the validity of i ID , A T and the equality of
The proposed protocol
To withstand different kinds of attacks, we propose an improved scheme based on Chen's scheme. It consists of four phases namely registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase, respectively. Detailed steps can be described as follows.
Registration phase
With the smart card stored some personal information of user i U such as date of birth, electronic signature and mobile phone number, user i U needs to implement the following steps to finish the registration phase.
• First, user i U generates two integers u X and IDE separately and secretly stores them into his or her own memory device. To ensure the safety of system, u X and IDE should be selected from the random numbers whose bits are larger than 1024.
• User i U freely chooses his or her identity ) (ID and password ) (PW .
• . The integer K is also secretly stored in the database of server j S as the secret information.
• j S randomly chooses a big integer ss X (greater than 1024 bits) as the secret key of itself and then stores it in the database.
• j S selects two large prime numbers p and g , where g is the generator of group G and the binary value of p must be more than 1024 bits.
• 
Login phase
To login into server j S , user i U needs to insert his or her smart card into the corresponding smart card reader and undertakes the following steps.
.
• i U sends the login request { , , , , , }
u T M N C D EID′ to j S
via a secure channel.
Authentication phase
When j S receives the login request from i U , the following steps are performed to authenticate both sides.
• j S records the timestamp u T ′ of received login request and compares the maximum transmission delay T ∆ with
, the login request will be rejected by server j S .
, i U will reject the login request. . If so, j S will reject the login request.
•
. The server's authentication on user is completed if
• i U and j S , respectively, calculate the session key:
Password change phase
To change the password, user i U needs to conduct the following steps: to the server via a secure channel.
• The mutual authentication process will be executed after j S receives the request.
Performance of the proposed protocol
Security analysis
Smart card stolen attack
We assume that the smart card of i U is stolen by an attacker. By power analysis, the attacker can retrieve all the information
stored in the smart card. However, if the attacker wants to login into server j S , he or she needs to obtain the identity ID , the password PW , the secret key u X and IDE of user i U . To forge the legal login request, the attacker also needs to calculate the following parameters:
. Suppose the attacker knows the secret key u X
and IDE of i U , it is computationally impossible to get the user's identity ID and password PW owing to the one-way collision-resistant property of the hash function (.) h . Suppose the lengths of password and identity of i U are e and r , respectively, the possibilities to guess the password and identity correctly are where m denotes the length of secret key ss X and su X . As a result, the proposal is secure against smart card stolen attack.
Password-guessing attack
between server j S and user i U are intercepted by an attacker, where
On the basis of the fact that the random numbers 1 u and 2 u and secret keys IDE , u X and ss X are hidden in the abovementioned parameters, there is no chance for an attacker to launch the password-guessing attack without knowing 1 u , 2 u IDE , u X and ss X .
Impersonation attack (user or server)
During 
, which is computationally impossible owing to the one-way collisionresistant property of the hash function (.) h . Similar with the user impersonation attack, the attacker cannot forge
and launch the server impersonation attack. Thus, the proposed scheme is immune to impersonation attacks. is actually not changed by the attacker, j S will surely decline the attacker's login request, which means the proposed scheme has the ability to defend it from replay attack.
Replay attack
Privileged insider attack
Assume that an attacker has successfully invaded inside server j S and has prepared for the privileged insider attack. There is no chance for this attacker to get the identity ID , where K is the secret key of server. Thus, the proposed scheme can be prevented from man-in-middle attack.
Password-guessing attack based on identity analysed
As mentioned earlier, many users prefer to register on all kinds of websites and network apps using the same identity and password, which facilitates the attacker to seek the same identity-password pair in the database of the website or app invaded by him or her through comparison of the plaintext of identity retrieved from the user's smart card. Even if an attacker has collected amounts of identities and the corresponding passwords, owing to these identities and passwords are encrypted from the beginning of registration phase to the end of the whole authentication process in the proposed scheme, it can greatly decrease the probability for the attacker to successfully find the user's identity or password. On no condition could he or she find the right one from thousands of pairs in terms of the fact that the proposed scheme is against replay attack and passwordguessing attack based on identity analysis.
Efficiency analysis
Owing to the insignificant computation cost during registration phase and not all schemes containing the password change phase, we only consider the computation difference between the login phase and the authentication phase of the seven schemes. The comparisons of computation complexity in Table 3 show that the proposed scheme has achieved high security without sacrificing computation efficiency. From Table 3 , we can find that the proposed scheme has the desirable performance on time consumption similar with other six schemes and, meanwhile, is superior to them with the higher security level. The extra computation costs of users in login phase can be considered as lightweight hash and symmetric key encryption/decryption operations. 
Conclusions
ID authentication based on smart card has been becoming one of the hot spots especially in mobile electronic business and social network applications. However, security issues of current prevalent solutions are criticised and most of them cannot meet the demands of practical applications. In this paper, Chen's scheme is taken as a representative example together with other schemes, which suffer from many known attacks such as the offline password-guessing attack, impersonation attack and man-in-middle attack. To overcome most of the security loopholes of user's smart card, a well-designed ID authentication scheme based on difficulty of discrete logarithm is proposed, which realises the mutual authentication and hides the user's identity. Security analysis demonstrates this protocol can resist most of the known attacks. Simultaneously, compared with other schemes, this proposal achieves the satisfactory efficiency without excessive sacrifices of computation cost. However, communication complexity probably leads to extra network cost in this proposal owing to the frequent message exchange between the user and the server, which determines the future work is expected to find a communicationefficiency authentication scheme.
